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We present and characterize a source for a 5 GHz clocked polarization-based simplified BB84
protocol. Secret keys are distributed over 151.5 km of standard telecom fiber at a rate of 54.5
kbps. Potentially, an increased clock frequency of the experiment introduces correlations between
succeeding pulses. We discuss the impact of these correlations and propose measurements to estimate
the relevant parameters.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a way to dis-
tribute a secret key over a distance between two commu-
nicating parties, Alice and Bob. Since the first experi-
mental demonstration of the BB84 protocol in 1992 [1]
huge progress has been achieved and commercial devices
are now available. QKD systems with up to 2.5 GHz rep-
etition rate were used to exchange secret keys both at
high rates [2] and over long distances [3, 4]. Further-
more, early experiments with repetition rates of up to
10 GHz using the differential phase shift protocol [5, 6]
were performed.
However, none of the previously mentioned studies
considered the security issues which can appear due to
the increased repetition rate. Indeed, several issues con-
cerning correlations between succeeding pulses have been
discussed in literature. E.g. Kobayashi et al. modelled
the phase distribution of a gain-switched lasers used in
QKD experiments [7] and showed how to characterize
phase randomization. Other articles investigated corre-
lations which appear due to imperfect decoy encoding
and gave ways to prevent those [8, 9].
In this work, we demonstrate secret key exchange using
the simplified BB84 protocol [10–12] and polarization en-
coding running at a pulse repetition rate of 5 GHz over
distances of 101 km and 151.5 km. Moreover, we iden-
tify three possible security loopholes which are related
to the high repetition rate and measure the correspond-
ing parameters. The first potential loophole may arise
when encoding the qubit, since the polarization states of
succeeding pulses may be slightly correlated. Similarly a
correlation may appear in the intensities of the decoy and
signal states [9]. The third loophole concerns the laser
source. A necessary assumption in security proofs of de-
coy state BB84 is a random phase between the pulses
emitted by the gain-switched distributed feedback lasers
[13]. However, at high pulse rates the phase correlations
between the pulses may appear [7]. We characterize the
degree of phase-randomization by means of an interfer-
ence experiment and discuss a model to take non-perfect
phase-randomization into account when calculating the
secret key rate (SKR). Typically, these three loopholes
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become stronger at high pulse repetition rate and it is
important to characterize these effects.
We employ the fiber-based setup depicted in Figure 1
and implement the 1-decoy protocol [13, 14]. Alice uses
a gain-switched distributed feedback multi-quantum well
laser (Gooch and Housego AA0701) driven at a repeti-
tion rate of 5 GHz to create pulses at a center wavelength
of 1550.92 nm with a duration of 43 ps (FWHM). After
an additional polarizer (POL), the light is polarized with
an extinction of more than 40 dB. A Lithium Niobate
electro-optical intensity modulator (IM) with a band-
width of 20 GHz (Oclaro SD-20) is used to switch between
signal and a decoy intensites. The polarization modula-
tion is achieved via an electro-optical phase modulator
(PM) with a bandwidth of 10 GHz (iXblue MPZ-LN-10).
The laser pulses enter the PM with a linear polarization
at an angle of 45° with respect to the fast axis of the
birefringent crystal inside the PM. A voltage applied to
the crystal changes the difference in refractive index be-
tween the fast and slow axis and therefore changes the
relative phase between the two field components. The
PM has a nominal half-wave voltage Vpi of 7 V, i.e. the
voltage needed to delay a pulse along a specific axis by
a phase of pi (or λ/2)). However, the electric field affects
also the orthogonal axis. This means in order to obtain a
phase of pi between the orthogonal polarization modes a
voltage higher than 7 V is needed. A field programmable
gate array (FPGA) controls both the IM and PM. Since
the IM requires only two levels, we drive it by directly
amplifying the digital signal of the FPGA. To drive the
PM, a digital-to-analog converter (DAC) with a symbol
rate up to 32 GBaud (SHF 611 F) is used to provide a
three-level signal.
The birefringence of the PM crystal induces polariza-
tion mode dispersion which is compensated by a piece of
highly birefringent fiber with an approximate length of
9 m. A variable attenuator is used to reduce the mean
photon numbers at the output of Alice of the signal and
decoy state to µ0 and µ1, respectively. With an elec-
tronic polarization controller Alice stabilizes the polar-
ization arriving at Bob by using a feedback loop which
maximizes the SKR. The disperion compensating fiber
is used to compensate the chromatic dispersion of the
quantum channel. Bob detects the states with in-house
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FIG. 1: Schematic of the QKD setup. AMP: electrical amplifier; BS: beamsplitter; CC: classical channel; DAC:
digital-to-analog converter; DCF: dispersion compensating fiber; EPC: electronic polarization controller; FPGA: field
programmable gate array; HiBi Fiber: highly birefringent fiber; IM: intensity modulator; PBS: polarizing beamsplitter; PC:
polarization controller; PM: phase modulator; POL: polarizer; QC: quantum channel; SNSPD: Superconducting nanowire
single photon detector; VA: variable attenuator. The dashed boxes are temperature stabilized. The blue lines represent highly
birefringent fibers. Electric wiring is shown as black lines.
made superconducting nanowire single photon detectors
(SNSPD) based on molybdenum silicide [15]. The effi-
ciency of these detectors varies with the incident polar-
ization. To obtain the same efficiency for all four states,
we align the polarization of the incoming pulses just in
front of the detectors.
The protocol goes as follows: Alice prepares randomly
one of three possible states. Either she sends one of the
two orthogonal states |0〉 and |1〉 which form the Z basis
or she sends |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2. The states |+〉 and
|−〉 = (|0〉−|1〉)/√2 form the X basis. The random num-
bers used for the choice of the state are generated in real
time using 26 AES cores seeded by a quantum random
number generator [3]. Bob chooses between the Z and
X basis passively with a balanced beam splitter. The se-
cret key is extracted from outcomes where both Alice and
Bob choose the Z basis and all other events can be used
to estimate the information a potential eavesdropper Eve
has on the key.
We perform secret key exchanges over spooled fibers of
101.0 km and 151.5 km length. The chosen mean photon
numbers for the decoy states are µ0 = 0.3 and µ1 =
0.15 and the probability of sending µ0 is 0.6 for both
distances. These values were found by optimizing the
SKR numerically. The probability that Alice sends the
Z-basis is 0.9 and the probability of Bob choosing the
Z basis is 0.5. The detector dark count rates are below
191 Hz per detector at efficiencies higher than 80% and
a jitter lower than 40 ps [15].
Sources of errors are detector noise, misalignment of
Alice’s and Bob’s bases and imperfect preparation of the
states at Alice. Indeed, Alice generates the states
|ψj〉 = cos θj
2
|0〉+ sin θj
2
|1〉 (1)
where j = 0, 1 or +. In practice, the angles θj deviate
slightly from the ideal values 0, pi and pi/2, a limitation
called state preparation flaws (SPF). In Figure 2 we ob-
serve that the |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are not perfectly orthogonal.
We use a low-density parity-check (LDPC) code for
error correction [16], implemented in the FPGA and of-
fering a high throughput. For a quantum bit error rate
(QBER) QZ up to 3%, the code rate is 2/3, i.e. the
leakage λEC is one third of the sifted key. The used im-
plementation corrects blocks of 1944 bits and one pri-
vacy amplification block consists of 4192 error correction
blocks.
The phase error rate φZ is estimated following the loss-
tolerant quantum cryptography analysis [10, 11], taking
into account the SPF. In the three state protocol, not
only the events where Alice and Bob choose the X basis
are used to estimate the phase error rate, but also the
events where Alice and Bob choose the Z basis and the
X basis, respectively. The measured SPF (see Table II)
increase the number of detections of the state |+〉 when
Alice sends a state in the Z basis, leading to an overes-
timated phase error rate. We can compensate for this
increased number of events and obtain a better estimate
of the phase error rate following the loss-tolerant security
analysis [10, 11].
The number of single photon events in the Z basis,
noted s1,Z , and the single photon events needed to bound
φZ is estimated using the decoy method [14]. After pri-
vacy amplification, Alice and Bob hold a secret key of
length
l ≥s1,Z(1− h(φZ))− λEC
− 6 log2(19/sec)− log2(2/corr). (2)
The parameters sec = 1 · 10−9 and corr = 1 · 10−15 are
the security and correctness parameters, respectively.
3Fiber length (km) Attenuation (dB) Sifted key rate (kbps) φZ (%) QZ (%) SKR (kbps)
101.0 20.2 2320.2 3.67 1.93 392.7
151.5 30.3 330.0 3.50 1.88 54.5
TABLE I: Measured secret key rate (SKR) and corresponding experimental parameters. φZ is the phase error rate and QZ is
the QBER Z. The given rates are averages over ten privacy amplification blocks.
Table I shows the SKR and the corresponding QBER
and phase error rate in the Z basis versus the quantum
channel fiber length. At the distance of 101.0 km our de-
tectors are at the edge of saturation. These secret key
rates do not take into account the correlations between
succeeding pulses which we discuss in the following chap-
ters. We achieved an average SKR of 54.5 kbps over
ten privacy amplification blocks after 151.5 km of single
mode fiber. Compared to already existing implementa-
tions, this is an improvement of more than a factor of
five at the same distance [4, 5, 17].
In addition to SPF discussed above, we can also have
correlations between the states. In case of nearest neigh-
bour correlations, the states take the form
|ψj|k〉 = cos
θj|k
2
|0〉+ sin θj|k
2
|1〉 , (3)
where k = 0, 1 or + is the bit value of the previous state.
The angle is now θj|k = θj+δj|k. We say that correlations
are present when the angles δj|k are not zero.
We determine the correlations in the polarization of
the pulses as follows: Alice emits repeatedly a sequence
of 32 states with the probabilities pAZ /2 for |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉
and probability pAX for |ψ+〉. At Alice’s quantum chan-
nel output (see Figure 1) we put a simple polarimeter
consisting of a rotatable quarter-wave plate (QWP) in a
U-bench, a linear polarizer and a SNSPD. This config-
uration allows us to infer the Stokes parameters of each
pulse in the sequence [18]. The average of a state over
all previous states is given by
|ψj〉 =
∑
k |ψj|k〉
|∑k,l 〈ψj|k|ψj|l〉 |2 (4)
This average only depends on θj . The correlation angles
δj|k are retrieved from the overlap of the measured states
|ψj|k〉 with |ψj〉.
|ψ0〉 |ψ1〉 |ψ+〉
Average angle θj (°) 8.0 165.6 90.0
Max. deviation maxk δj|k(°) 6.3 6.9 8.0
TABLE II: Measured angles of the average states and the
maximum deviation from this angle.
The measured states are shown on the Poincar sphere
in Figure 2 and the values of θj and of the maximum devi-
ations angles maxk δj|k can be found in Table II. The ref-
erence frame for the measurement was chosen such that
the average angle θ+ is exactly 90°. In Figure 2 it can
be seen that the states show correlation with the pulse
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FIG. 2: States prepared by Alice in the Poincar sphere.
The state |ψ0|k〉 is marked in red, |ψ1|k〉 in green and |ψ+|k〉
in blue. The index k is the value of the previous state. The
triangles mark states where k = 0, the squares mark states
where k = 1 and the circles mark states where k = +.
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FIG. 3: Intensity of the decoy states. The first two bars
show the mean intensity of the signal (µ0) and decoy (µ1)
state. The four last bars show the mean intensity of a state
conditioned on the state sent before.
which was sent before. This is mainly due to the the
distortion introduced by the limited bandwidth of the
electronic supply chain of the PM.
There exists a security proof considering correlation
between the states [19], however it requires the angles δj|k
to be of the order of 0.1° which is challenging to achieve
in practice. Fluctuations by this angle would correspond
to a QBER of 3 · 10−6. More theoretical work is needed
to obtain a proof with a tighter bound on the secret key
rate.
To characterize the correlations in the decoy intensity
we use Alice’s setup (grey box in Figure 1) and prepare
repeatedly a sequence of 32 pulses containing all the four
nearest-neighbour combinations. The sequence is mea-
sured with an optical oscilloscope at the output of Alice.
We measured the relative intensities of the decoy and sig-
nal state conditioned on which state was sent before. The
results are depicted in Figure 3. We see a slight relative
4change in intensity of up to 3%, depending on what was
sent before.
There exists a security analysis which takes into ac-
count only independent and identically distributed fluc-
tuations of the decoy intensities [20]. However, following
this security proof, the finite key correction terms go with
the square root of the number of pulses sent by Alice. In
contrast to the case of uncorrelated sources where the fi-
nite key correction terms scale with the square root of the
number of pulses detected by Bob. This means that huge
block sizes of the order of 1010 are required if we don’t
want the maximum distance to be limited by this effect.
There is a technique based on post-processing operations
which can be applied to correlated decoy intensities [9],
but further work is needed to evaluate the impact of these
correlations.
In order to determine to which degree the phase be-
tween two succeeding laser pulses is correlated, we em-
ploy a simple model of a gain-switched laser source. We
assume that a pulse has a perfectly correlated phase with
respect to the previous pulse with probability pc or else
the phase is completely arbitrary. Under this assump-
tion, we measure the degree of phase correlation pc using
a fiber Michelson interferometer with a tunable arm with
length ∆d which is needed to maximize the overlap of
two subsequent pulses. To estimate the interferometer’s
imperfections, we measure the fringe visibility VCW(∆d)
when operating the laser source in continuous wave mode.
Then we measure the fringe visibility Vpulsed(∆d) oper-
ating the laser source with the same parameters as for
the QKD setup. The degree of phase correlation is then
estimated by
p∗c = max
∆d
Vpulsed(∆d)
VCW(∆d)
(5)
optimizing ∆d. By doing so, we would overestimate pc
if the coherence length of the laser source in continuous
wave mode wasn’t sufficient. We find a very small value
of p∗c = 0.0019.
What is the influence of an imperfect phase random-
ization on the security of the protocol? According to our
model, this means that a proportion p∗c of pulses are po-
tentially insecure and Eve could use the phase coherence
to obtain a bit more information. In the worst case sce-
nario each insecure pulse contributes a bit to the final
key and Eve can infer this bit due to non-random phase
between this pulse and the adjacent pulses. Therefore
we can avoid this loophole by reducing the key length by
a factor 1 − p∗c before privacy amplification. Given the
measured value, we can conclude that the degree of phase
correlation has a negligible effect on the SKR. Still, we
take it into account by multiplying Equation 2 by 1−p∗c .
We demonstrated the implementation of a BB84 pro-
tocol at 5 GHz pulse repetition rate and established high
SKRs over 101.0 km and 151.5 km of fiber. We used
state-of-the-art secret key distillation taking account fi-
nite key analysis and SPF. However, we identified three
potential security loopholes opening in particular at high
clock rates. These are correlations in the polarization
state preparation, correlations between the mean pho-
ton numbers of succeeding pulses and imperfect phase
randomization of the laser source. While we verified ex-
perimentally that these effects are reasonably small, we
realize that with the current security proofs the impact
on the secret key rates and distance can be important, in
particular for the correlations in the state preparations.
Arguably, this is an issue for all QKD systems also at
lower repetition rate. Additional theoretical analysis is
clearly needed here in future.
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